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Appellant Edward Loosli petitions the Court for rehearing of
the Opinion filed herein on March 16, 1993 ("Slip Opinion" herein),
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
POINTS OF LAW OR FACT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED
Petitioner submits that none of the issues submitted for
review in Brief of Appellant were ruled upon or decided by the
Slip Opinion.
1.

The issues thus unresolved are:

Whether the Utah Landowner Liability Act preserves

liability of a landowner who willfully fails to guard or warn
against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity or if it
eliminates any and all liability of a landowner who invites public
use, in the event of injuries to recreational users.
2.

Whether the trial court erred by denying jury trial on

factual questions concerning whether there was a willful failure
to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or
activity.
3.

Whether it was error for the trial court to deny jury

trial on a parallel claim based upon Restatement (Second) Property
§17.2 defining a duty to guard or warn against unreasonable risks
to others when a landowner leases property for purposes involving
use by the public.
4.

Whether it was error for the trial court to strike

Plaintiff's showing, in the manner provided by Rule 56, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, of disputed material facts on the theory that
the showing does not constitute "evidence."

5.

Whether the trial court erred by ruling on causation as a

matter of law.
Instead of deciding any of the foregoing issues, the Slip
Opinion dwells on whether the Act applies, which is not an issue
because we conceded at Brief of Appellant 15-16, and 25 that the
Act does apply.

Thus the Opinion fails to decide, or even

acknowledge, the error of the trial court in holding that the Act
eliminates any and all liability.

The Opinion also fails to

decide, or even acknowledge, whether the trial court erred by
taking clear factual questions from determination of a jury.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from summary judgment holding that the Utah
Limitation of Landowner Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-14-1,
et seg.

(the "Act" herein), relieved Defendant-Appellee

Kennecott Copper Corporation ("Kennecott" herein) of any and all
liability as a landowner for injuries to a recreational user of
its property and refusing Plaintiff-Appellant Edward "Ted" Loosli
("Loosli" herein) jury trial on his allegations of willful failure
to guard or warn of dangerous conditions or structures on the
property, within the meaning and intent of (1) the exception from
the limit of liability at Utah Code Ann. § 57-14-6, and/or (2) the
liability of a lessor of land who leases for a purpose involving
admission of the public to guard or warn against unreasonable
risks of harm to foreseeable users under the lease.
Loosli suffered a broken spine, paralyzing him from the neck
down, while riding an off-road vehicle, or ATV, on property owned

- 2 -

by Defendant-Appellee Kennecott Copper Corporation where there
were posts and timbers protruding above the ground alleged to be
inherently dangerous for ATV travel.

The land had been leased to

the State of Utah for public use an an ATV park.

The facts are

stated in further detail at Brief of Appellant.
The trial court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge,
presiding, entered summary judgment for Kennecott, denied the
cross-motion of Loosli and denied jury trial on the question of
whether Kennecott willfully failed to guard or warn of any dangerous condition or structure on the property.
This Court affirmed in the Slip Opinion dated March 16, 1993,
but failed to address the question of the nature and scope of
liability in cases where recreational use is invited, which is
first impression under the Act, or the trial court'& holding that
the Act eliminated any and all liability.
ARGUMENT
The burden of the Slip Opinion is confined to holding that
"the meaning of 'willful or malicious' set forth in [Utah Code
Ann.] Section 57-14-6 involves the tripartite standard defined in
Golding

[v.

Ashley

Central

Irrigation

Co.,

793 P.2d 897 (Utah

1990)]" (Slip Opinion, p. 4), although the holding in
was never in serious dispute.

Golding

The Slip Opinion merely holds that

Loosli's showing in opposition to summary judgment was not
"sufficient to create an underlying issue of material fact as to
Kennecott's knowledge or lack thereof9" without ever acknowledging
that Loosli had demanded a jury or explaining, in face of the jury
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demand, how any factual issue could be resolved by the trial
judge, or by this Court.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT, AND THIS COURT, ERR BY
REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE ACT
PRESERVES "LIMITED" LIABILITY
The Slip Opinion correctly recites at p. 4 that the Act's
limit of liability is "[e]xcept as specifically provided in
Subsection (1) of Section 57-14-6" and that said Section 6 preserves liability for a "willful or malicious failure to guard or
warn . . . ."

Inexplicably, the Slip Opinion then fails to give

any effect to those provisions.
A.

The Trial Court's Finding of "No Liability" Must Be Reversed,
It is therefore patent error that the Slip Opinion fails to

address the point that the trial judge unequivocally ruled that
the Landowners Liability Act eliminates all liability.

Conclusion

of Law No. 7 at p. 9 of the trial court's rulings (attached hereto
as an appendix) was as follows:
7. Kennecott had no duty of care to keep
the premises safe for entry by Plaintiff or to
give any warning of a dangerous conditon, use
structure, or activity on its premises to
plaintiff. (Emphasis added.)
It is therefore sham, and misses the point of Loosli's appeal
entirely, to address the meaning of the term "willful and
malicious" under Utah Code Ann. §57-14-6(1) at Slip Opinion p. 4.
The trial court plainly held that the Landowner's Liability Act
eliminates any and all liability and that Kennecott has no
liability.

Loosli was given no opportunity to prove that
- 4 -

Kennecott violated the willful or malicious standard, however it
may be defined.
The trial court ruled that the Act's declaration at Utah Code
Ann. § 57-14-3 that "an owner of land owes no duty of care" had
the effect of releasing Kennecott from any and all liability.

The

error in that ruling, never addressed by the Slip Opinion, is that
the Act does not create a blanket release of the duty of care
simply by virtue of a landowner making his land available for
recreational use.
liability.

The Act provides only for a limit of

It is entitled "Limitation of Landowner Liabilities"

(emphasis added) and both Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-14-3 and 4 declare
the limitation to be "except as specifically provided in
Subsection (1) of Section 57-14-6," providing as follows:
Liability not limited where willful or malicious
conduct involved or admission fee charged.
(1) Nothing in this act shall limit any
liability which otherwise exists for:
(a) willful or malicious failure to guard
or warn against a dangerous condition, use,
structure, or activity;
(b) deliberate, willful, or malicious
injury to persons or property.
(Emphasis added.)
The Slip Opinion thus fails to address, and reverse the error
of Conclusion of Law No. 7 that "Kennecott had no duty of care to
keep the premises safe for entry by Plaintiff or to give any
warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity."
That Conclusion is contrary to the plain provisions of Section 6.
The well-established duty under tort law to guard or warn against
any dangerous condition, use or structure carefully defined by
this Court in e.g., Darrington

v.

Wade,
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812 P.2d 452 (Utah

App., 1991), is unambiguously one of the liabilities "which
otherwise exist" which Section 6 refers to.

That duty is clearly

preserved, even if the standard of care is reduced by the term
"willful."
This Court plainly denied Loosli any appeal, or rendered the
appeal process a sham and delusion, by failing to reverse the
plain error of the trial court in that regard.
B.

The "Tripartite Standard" Requires Proof of Facts.
Recitation at Slip Opinion 4 of the "tripartite stardard" of

Colding

v. Ashley

Central

Irrigation

Co.,

793 P.2d 897, 900

(Utah 1990) is meaningless, in context, and ignores the point of
this appeal.
We have never disputed the holding of Golding*
advised this Court that Golding,
construing the Act, Crawford
1989) and Jerz

v. Salt

We have

and the only other cases

v„ Tilley,

Lake County,

780 P.2d 1248 (Utah

822 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991)

deal with trespassers or others who were not invited to make
recreational use of the land.

The question of this appeal, by

contrast, is what standards apply to one who is invited to make
recreational use.

That question involves the three stage analysis

of (1) determining if the Act applies (viz., if there was an
invitation to others to make recreational use, which is admitted
herein), (2) whether there was a willful failure to guard or warn
of a dangerous conditon and (3) if not, what the "limit" of
liability then shall be.

The latter two points of the analysis

have never been addressed by this or any other court.
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They were

exhaustively examined in Brief of Appellant but are ignored by the
Slip Opinion and remain for decision.
The Supreme Court plainly held in Golding

that "the

pleadings are insufficient to demonstrate that the Act's
protections are available to the irrigation company" because "the
complaint did not adequately allege a 'willful or malicious
failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition'" and
remanded on that issue.

Thus Golding

never reached, other than

by dicta, the second stage of the analysis, viz.,

whether the

standard was violated, involving factual questions as to which
Loosli cannot be denied jury trial.
Loosli, by contrast, squarely alleged at paragraph 6 of the
Amended Complaint that
Kennecott was aware of and willfully failed to
guard or warn members of the public, including
Loosli, against dangerous conditions existing
on the Lark Sand Dunes, including the existence
of scores and perhaps hundreds of posts, projections, timbers and structures, many of which
were concealed or partially concealed and which
were the remains of abandoned mining or processing facilities of Kennecott and which made the
operation of off-road vehicles thereon, ATVs in
particular, dangerous, particularly to persons
unfamiliar with the operation of off-road vehicles or unaware of said dangerous conditions and
willfully failed to guard or warn Loosli and
members of the public of the dangers of the
activity of operating off-road vehicles, ATVs
in particular, under conditions and hazards
such as were present at the Lark Sand Dunes,
within the meaning and intent of Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-14-6(1)(a).
In this case, the question is whether the Act's limitation of
liability has any effect if there was a "willful failure to warn
against a dangerous condition [or] structure" as contemplated by
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Section 6.

That question is not answered by Golding

holding there was that the Act did not apply.

because the

The presence of a

condition or structure and Kennecott's failure to guard or warn
were agreed, and in fact acknowledged at Slip Opinion p. 2, but
whether it was dangerous remained disputed.

This Court cannot

rule on that question as a matter of law until such time as the
facts are determined by a jury.
Kennecott led the trial court into error by urging that the
Act simply means that a landowner no longer owes any "duty of
care" and that "the plain meaning of the Act affords landowners
who fall under its rubric full protection from liability."
(Emphasis added.)

That conclusion was adopted by the trial court

and emasculates the exceptions of Section 6.

That conclusion also

fails to give effect to the words "nothing in this act shall limit
any liability which otherwise exists" in the preamble to Section 6
or to recognize the implications of those common law concepts.
The Slip Opinion fails to address those errors of law.
This Court has adopted the trial court's conclusion never
examining what the standard is under Section 6 in circumstances
where the Act does apply.
POINT II
THE SLIP OPINION IMPROPERLY DENIED JURY TRIAL
ON FACTUAL ISSUES
Slip Opinion p. 2 concedes that "the property had timbers
protruding from the sand, which apparently constituted remains of
an abandoned mill" and at Slip Opinion 6 that "in the opinion of
• . . an accident reconstruction expert, Loosli's accident was
- 8 -

caused by the right rear wheel of the ATV striking an object on
the ground,"

It was nevertheless concluded that "Loosli failed to

present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact as to Kennecott's knowledge or lack thereof."

The Slip

Opinion thus commits plain error by indulging in weighing the
evidence.
Those rulings of the Slip Opinion mirror Finding of Fact Nos.
11 and 12 at pp. 7-8 of the trial court (see Appendix hereto),
reciting that "[t]here is no evidence that . . . any Kennecott
employee had knowledge of any condition or structure on the
property dangerous enough that the probable result of contact with
that condition or structure would have been serious injury" and
that "[t]here is no evidence that any Kennecott employee willfully
or maliciously failed to guard or warn against any dangerous
condition or structure on the property."
Both the Slip Opinion and the findings of the trial court
ignore Loosli's right to a jury trial on that issue.
A.

Every Factual Question Must Be Decided By A Jury.
Loosli formally demanded jury trial, not once but twice. Rule

38(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure declares that the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved to the parties. Nevertheless,
the trial judge weighed the evidence, found it insufficient and
then ruled that "Plaintiff's Motion for a Trial by Jury is deemed
moot and is, therefore, hereby denied" (see Rulings on Pending
Motions, etc., R. 892, attached as an Appendix hereto at %3),
thereby invading the province of the jury.
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This Court magnified

the trial judge's error, acknowledging that Loosli had made a
factual showing through an accident reconstruction expert, but
then proceeding to weigh the evidence and hold it lacking.
The allegation of a willful failure to guard or warn is a jury
question under landowner liability statutes which cannot be disposed of as a matter of law.

Mandell

v. United

States,

963 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying Arkansas law). Accord.,
New Philadelphia,

719 F.2d
Bier

v.

11 Ohio St.3d 134, 464 N.E.2d 147 (1986)

(summary judgment reversed, defendant may be liable for failure to
install lightning protection on a park shelter).

Such holdings

are an aspect of the proposition frequently stated by this court
that summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
County,

E.g.

Ehlers

& Ehlers

Architects

v. Carbon

805 P.2d 789 (Utah App. 1991).

The Slip Opinion thus ignores the square holding of this Court
that questions concerning discharge of any standard of care are
uniquely for the trier of fact and not susceptible to ruling as a
matter of law.

E.g.,

Wycalis

v. Guardian

Title,

780 P.2d 821,

825 (Utah App. 1989):
As a general proposition, summary judgment is
inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on
its merits, and should be employed "only in the
most clearcut case." Of particular concern
is the precept that "[o]rdinarily, whether a
defendant has breached the required standard of
care is a question of fact for the jury."
Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate
unless the applicable standard of care is "fixed
by law," and reasonable minds could reach but
one conclusion as to the defendant's negligence
under the circumstances. Furthermore, the Utah
Supreme Court has held that since summary
- 10 -

disposition denies the losing party "the
privilege of a trial," art. I, § 11 of the Utah
Constitution suggests that "doubt or uncertainty
as to the questions of negligence . . . should
be resolved in favor of granting . . . a
trial." (Citations omitted.)
This Court held in Darrington

v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah

App. 1991), that the closely related question of the landowner's
duty to guard or warn under Restatement §17.2 is uniquely a
question of fact for the jury:
In this case, the foreseeability issue
boils down to a question of reasonableness. To
what extent would a prudent landowner reasonably inspect the premises prior to parting with
possession? . . . .
Ordinarily, such questions of reasonableness necessarily pose questions of fact which
should be reserved for jury resolution and,
except in the clearest cases, should not be
disposed of by summary judgment. Williams v.
Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 727-28 (Utah 1985);
Wycalis v. Guardian Title,
780 P.2d 821, 825
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). This is only an aspect of
the general rule that "summary judgment should
be granted with great caution when negligence is
alleged." See English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d
1154, 1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Otherwise "far
too many issues [would be removed] from the
jury's consideration." Sharp v. W.H. Moore,
Inc., 796 P.2d at 510. Therefore,
summary judgment is [generally] inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on
its merits, and should be employed "only
in the most clear cut case" . . . [where]
the applicable standard of care is "fixed
by law," and reasonable minds could reach
but one conclusion as to the defendant's
negligence under the circumstances. . . .
[Any] "doubt or uncertainty as to the
questions of negligence . . . should be
resolved in favor of granting a trial."
812 P.2d at 459 (citations omitted).
To the same effect, the Supreme Court held in Bowen v.
Riverton

City,

656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982), that summary
- 11 -

judgment is "appropriate in negligence cases . • . only in the
most clear-cut case" for the reason that matters such as
inspection of the road sign in the River ton City

case, and

whether the defendant "should, and if so could, have responded
more effectively and quickly is a matter for trial"

Id. at 437.

The question of whether Kennecott discharged its duty under
Section 6 and Restatement §17.2 is thus for the jury, for
"weighing evidence is proper only when making findings of fact,
not when determining questions of law . . . on a motion for
summary judgment."
1991).

See also,

Winegar v. Froerer

Busch v. State

Corp.,

Farm Fire

813 P.2d 104 (Utah

and Casualty

Co.,

743

P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987).
The Slip Opinion thus errs.

The standard of care under the

Act is not "fixed by statute," unless this Court is prepared to
memorialize, in a published opinion, the holding of the trial
court that mere invitation to others to use the Lark Sand Dunes
invokes the "no duty of care" provisions of Utah Code Ann. §
57-14-4.

That holding is plain error, for it reads the exception

contained in Utah Code Ann. § 57-14-6, which the Slip Opinion
acknowledges at p. 4, out of the Act entirely.
B.

The Slip Opinion Ignores Multiple Fact Questions,
Loosli's showing that Kennecott knew of the protruding timbers

at the Lark Sand Dunes was undisputed (see Brief of Appellant pp.
36-37).

Indeed, the Slip Opinion recites at p. 2 that there were

such obstructions and at p. 6 that Loosli presented the affidavit
of an expert on accident reconstruction (R. 704) that the accident

- 12 -

could not have occurred without contact with such an obstruction.
Those matters, standing alone, present a clear factual issue which
cannot properly be taken from the jury*
In addition, three witnesses [viz.,

Plaintiff and his son,

Adam Loosli, and the Park Ranger, Mr. McKowen], each of whose
depositions were ordered published by the trial court, testified
that there were numerous timbers or posts protruding at the site
of the accident.

Moreover, Loosli presented photographs and maps

showing protrusions at the accident site, the Affidavit of LeRoy
Peterson (R. 701) that the accident occurred near the projecting
timbers and the affidavits submitted in support of Kennecott/s
Motion further support Loosli's showing to the extent that they
acknowledge that Kennecott was aware of considerable "debris" at
the Lark Sand Dunes.
The Slip Opinion errs to the extent that it ignores Loosli's
showing in that regard.

It was agreed that Kennecott had not

warned Loosli or any other recreational user of the Lark Sand
Dunes of the projecting timbers.

A jury might conclude that the

"debris" consisted of the protruding remains of Kennecott's mining
facilities and that they were inherently dangerous.
C.

The Slip Opinion Fails to Address Striking of Plaintiff's
Showing.
The Slip Opinion further errs by failing to reverse, or

address in any way, the trial court's order purporting to strike
Loosli's showing of disputed material facts by way of affidavits,
maps and photographs showing the projecting timbers.
The trial court ordered Loosli's affidavits, R. 701, 704,
- 13 -

filed, but simultaneously stricken, then declared that topographic
maps of the Lark Sand Dunes, R. 781, showing the projections at
the site of the accident had been considered as part of the
arguments on the motions, but that "the Court finds that the
exhibits need not be retained as if they had become a part of the
evidentiary record and, therefore, denies the motion [for leave to
(See Rulings on Pending Motions, Appendix % 6.)

file them]."

Such rulings misconceive summary judgment procedure and assume
that a motion for summary judgment must be resisted with
"evidence."

To the contrary, Rule 56(e) contemplates only that

there be a showing;
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided
in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
The United States Supreme Court's trilogy of opinions in 1986
dispel any notion that "evidence" is required under the identical
provisions of federal Rule 56.
Industrial

Co. v. Zenith

Celotex

Corp.

Liberty

Lobby,

Intermountain

Radio Corp.,

v. Catrett,
Inc.,
Health

See,

Matsushita

106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986);

477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson

All U.S. 242 (1986).
Care,

Electric

Inc.,

this Court adopted both Anderson

In Robinson

v.
v.

740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987),
v. Liberty

Lobby and

Celotex.

The Slip Opinion ignores those precepts and commits
fundamental error.

Loosli clearly met his burden by producing

depositions and affidavits, which are the very vehicles
contemplated by the Rule to make the required showing.

The trial

judge's ruling that the topographic maps were considered, but are
not "a part of the evidentiary record" and the court "therefore,
- 14 -

denies the motion" to file them only compounds the error.

Maps

are self-authenticating under Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-6.
Considering the standard on review of a summary judgment, it
is both futile and sham to order the affidavits and topographic
maps filed and considered for the Rule 56 hearing, but stricken
for purposes of appeal.

The Slip Opinion errs by ruling that

Loosli failed to meet his burden of a "showing" of disputed facts
without considering the matters presented in the trial court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, rehearing should be granted to
consider all of the issues presented for review, none of which were
considered or decided by the Slip Opinion.
This Court should construe Section 6, in the context of a lease
for purposes involving public use, to require showing of a
dangerous condition and a willful, or intentional failure to guard
or warn.

Those issues were extensively briefed in Brief of

Appellant, which arguments cannot be repeated in this Petition.
This Court should, therefore, order reconsideration of that
important question of first impression.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of March, 1993.
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Glen M. Richman, Esq.
Parker M. Nielson, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
(0682)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

EDWARD LOOSLI,
RULINGS ON PENDING MOTIONS,
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION,
a New York corporation
KENNECOTT MINING CORP., a
New York corporation, and
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation,

Civil No. 900901012PI
Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.
* * * * * * * *

Cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff
and Defendants in this matter came on for hearing under a special
setting before the Court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding,
on Friday, July 19, 1991. The Court, having considered the several memoranda submitted by both parties, having ordered publication of the depositions from the bench on the stipulation of
counsel,

having

heard

the argument

A P P E N D I X

of

counsel,

and having

considered the matter, made findings of fact and conclusions of
lav, and entered an order granting defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and denying plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.
On August 12, 1991, after the order was entered, Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial and a memorandum in support of
that motion.

In those pleadings, Plaintiff moved for a new trial

on the issues resolved in the order and in the findings of fact
and conclusions of law.

Defendants filed a Memorandum in Opposi-

tion to Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial,

The Court denied

Plaintiff's motion through a minute entry dated October 24, 1991.
Additionally, by way of a pleading titled Plaintiff's
Notice to Submit for Decision and correspondence to Judge Brian
dated August 20, 1991, and October 31f 1991, plaintiff's counsel
requested that the Court rule on motions pending in this matter
at the time the Court entered its referenced summary judgment
orders.

The Court originally chose not to rule on the pending

matters believing they were moot.

However, in response to the

request of plaintiff's counsel, this Court held a telephonic conference on November 4, 1991, during which plaintiff's counsel
again requested that the Court rule on all pending motions.
During the course of this litigation, the parties have
filed numerous pleadings both in support of and in opposition to
the pending motions.

The Court has reviewed these pleadings

which include, but are not necessarily limited to the following:
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Motion to Dismiss a Party Plaintiff and for Trial by Jury;
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Delete a Party Plaintiff and for Trial by Jury;
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Trial
by Jury;
Plaintiff's Responsive Memorandum to Defendant's Motion to
Strike Plaintiff's Proposed Amended Complaint and Defendant's [sic] in Opposition to Plaintiff's Demand for Trial
by Jury;
Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint and Answer to Kennecott's Motion to
Strike Plaintiff's Jury Demand;
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment;
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment;
Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment;
Consolidated Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's
Cross Motion for Pretrial Summary Judgment;
Motion to Strike Portions of Defendants' Affidavits;
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Portions of
Defendants' Affidavits;
Defendants' Consolidated Memorandum;
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike Portions of
Defendants' Affidavits;
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Cross Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment;
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint;
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to
File Amended Complaint;
Amended Complaint;
Kennecott's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and
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in Support of Kennecott's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's
Jury Demand;
Kennecott's Consolidated Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and
in Support of Kennecott's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's
Jury Demand;
Motion to File and Publish Deposition of Charles Stillman;
Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Jury Demand;
Plaintiff's Reply to Kennecott's Supplemental Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaitiff's Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment;
Motion for Leave to File Affidavit of Leroy Peterson;
Motion for Leave to File Affidavit of Dr. V. Morfopoulos;
Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits of Leroy Petersen
and Vassilis Morfopoulos;
Memorandum in Support
Affidavits;

of

Defendants' Motion

to Strike

Motion for Leave to File for Illustrative Purposes, Topographic Maps of the Lark Sand Dunes;
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave for Illustrative Purposes, Topographic Maps of the Lark Sand Dunes;
and
Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition
to Motion for Leave to File, for Illustrative Purposes,
Topographical Maps of the Lark Sand Dunes.
To achieve finality

in this case, the Court, having

reviewed the above listed pleadings and having reviewed the relevant law, makes the following:
RULINGS ON PENDING MOTIONS
1.

Plaintiff's Motions for Leave to File Affidavits

of LeRoy Peterson and Dr. Morfopoulos are hereby granted.
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2.

Defendants' Motion

to Strike

the Affidavits of

LeRoy Peterson and Dr. Morfopoulos is hereby granted.
3.

Plaintiff's Motion For a Trial by Jury is deemed

moot and isf therefore, hereby denied.
4.
hereby

Plaintiff's Motion to File Amended Complaint

granted, but,

in light

of

the Court's

ruling

is

on the

motions for summary judgment, an answer thereto would be moot and
thus, the Court rules that defendant shall have no obligation to
respond or otherwise answer the Amended Complaint, and, in light
of the Court's order denying the motion for jury trial, the Court
orders that the request for jury trial made by plaintiff in the
Amended Complaint is also denied.
5.

Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Portions of Defen-

dants' Affidavits is hereby denied.
6.

With respect to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to

File, for Illustrative Purposes, Topographic Maps of the Lark
Sand Dunes, the Court notes that these exhibits were offered for
illustrative purposes only and the Court considered them as part
of the arguments on the motions for summary judgment.

However,

not having been offered as part of the evidentiary record, the
Court finds that the exhibits need not be retained as if they had
become a part of the evidentiary record and, therefore, denies
the motion.
7.

Defendants' Motion to File and Publish Deposition

of Charles Stillman

is deemed moot
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by virtue of

the Court's

previous ruling from the bench ordering published all depositions
taken in the case but nonetheless is hereby granted.
Based on the Court's review of the record and having
ruled on the pending motions, the Court reaffirms the findings of
fact and conclusions of law which it entered on August 1, 1991,
and enters an amended order.

In doing so, the Court has reviewed

and considered the arguments set forth in both parties' pleadings
addressing the relevant

issues, as well as the allegations of

plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
The Court, therefore, now reaffirms

its findings of

fact by entering the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Kennecott owns a parcel of real property in Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, commonly referred to as the Lark Sand
Dunes.
2.

From August 1, 1977, to December

31, 1989, the

property was under lease to the State of Utah, Division of Parks
and Recreation, by Kennecott.
3.

There is a great demand for lands of this type for

recreational use.
4.

The Lease Agreement recited that the property was

to be used in conjunction with the State's recreational vehicle
program.
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5.

The State made the leased property available to

the public as a site for off-road recreational vehicle use and
neither Kennecott nor the State collected any fees or tolls from
recreational vehicle users, including Mr. Loosli, at the Lark
Sand Dunes.
6.

Prior to opening the Lark Sand Dunes, the State,

with the assistance of volunteers, used equipment to clean up
debris and to level out the terrain at various areas, and the
State had an ongoing program to look for and to clean up debris.
7.

More than ten years after Kennecott

turned the

property over to the State for its off-road recreational vehicle
use program, Mr. Loosli, on April 29, 1988, entered the property
for the purpose of operating a three-wheeled all-terrain recreational vehicle.
8.

While

riding

the vehicle on

the property, Mr.

Loosli had an accident which resulted in personal injury.

was

9.

Mr. Loosli does not know what caused the accident.

10.

There were no witnesses to the accident.

11.

There is no evidence that at the time the lease

executed

or during

the term of

the lease

any Kennecott

employee had knowledge of any condition or structure on the property dangerous enough that the probable result of contact with
that condition or structure would have been serious injury.
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12.

There is no evidence that any Kennecott employee

willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn against any dangerous condition or structure on the property.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court now reaffirms its
previously entered conclusions of law by entering the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

To encourage public and private landowners to make

their land available to the public for recreational purposes, the
State of Utah limits the liability of landowners towards persons
entering the land for recreational purposes.

S 57-14-1, Utah

Code Ann*
2.

Kennecott

is an "owner" of

"land" known as the

Lark Sand Dunes as those terms are defined in S 57-14-2, Utah
Code Ann.
3.

Kennecott leased the Lark Sand Dunes to the State

of Utah for a "recreational purpose" as that term is defined in S
57-14-2, Utah Code Ann.
4.

Kennecott did not "charge" an admission price or

fee to any person to enter the Lark Sand Dunes as that term is
defined in S 57-14-2, Utah Code Ann.
5.

Plaintiff is a "person" as that term is defined in

S 57-14-2, Utah Code Ann.
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6.

The Utah Limitation of Landowner Liability Actf

codified at Utah Code Ann. S 57-14-1, et sea, applies to and controls the resolution of this action.
7.

Kennecott had no duty of care to keep the premises

safe for entry by Plaintiff or to give any warning of a dangerous
condition,

use,

structure,

or

activity

on

its

premises

to

Plaintiff.
8.

Kennecott is protected from liability for Plain-

tiff's injuries pursuant to the provisions of S 57-14-4, Utah
Code Ann.
9.

Kennecott did not willfully or maliciously fail to

guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or
activity

so

as

to

bring

it

within

the

exception

of

S

57-14-6(1)(a), Utah Code Ann.
10.

Therefore, under the terms of the Utah Limitation

of Landowner Liability Act, Kennecott has no liability to Plaintiff for any injuries described in this action.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, the Court now hereby enters the following:
AMENDED ORDER
1.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby

2.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby

denied.

granted.
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3e

Plaintifffs

Complaint

as

well

as

Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint and each cause of action stated in each of them
are hereby dismissed, with prejudice, no cause of action.
4.

Plaintifffs Motion for New Trial is hereby denied.

5.

Each party shall bear its own costs incurred in

this matter to date.
lis
DATED this^x^^
day of December, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

PAT B. BRIAN
DISTRICT COURT
Prior to execution by the Court, this Rulings on Pending Motions, Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order was reviewed by Parker M. Neilson, attorney for plaintiff,
who concurs in its form on this

day of December, 1991.

BARKER M. NEILSON
JMB:110991A
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